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Within a dynamic programming approach we derive an optimal rule for the 
central bank to attain it's inflation targeting goals. The short-run nominal 
interest rate is used as an instrument to achieve monetary objectives. The 
model is tested for the Brazilian economy and compared with results found for 
other countries. Evidence for the estimated feedback interest rule for the 
Central Bank suggests that the cost of reducing inflation in an open economy is 
lower than that of a closed economy. 
 
JEL Classification: E43, E52. 





Através de técnicas de programação dinâmica derivamos uma regra ótima para 
o Banco Central atingir suas metas de inflação.  A taxa nominal de juros é 
utilizada como instrumento para atingir os objetivos de política monetária. O 
modelo é testado para a economia brasileira e comparam-se os resultados com 
encontrados para outros países. Evidência para regra de feedback encontrada 
sugere que os custos de reduzir a inflação em economias abertas é menor do 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Recently, several countries have been adopting a target inflation framework for monetary 
policy. New Zealand, Canada and United Kingdom have decided to employ an inflation 
targeting framework in the conduit of monetary policy and have successfully reduced their 
inflation rates and gained control on inflation
1. It is often argued that an independent 
central bank is a key element for a successful monetary policy. The good performance in 
the maintenance of low inflation rates that the National Bank of Switzerland and the 
Bundesbank have had is mainly attributed to their high level of independence, and it has 
certainly strongly influenced the position of the system of European central banks toward 
an independent central bank.  
 
Following this trend, other countries (e.g. Chile, Mexico, Argentina, Spain and France) 
have been granting a greater independence for their central banks allowing them to 
conduce monetary policy with much less government interference. The main goal is price 
stability and a common point among these countries has been the adoption of an inflation 
targeting framework. In Brazil, since mid-1999, six months after abandoning the fixed 
exchange rate regime, the Central Bank of Brazil has adopted an inflation targeting regime 
for the conduit of monetary policy.  
 
The main purpose of this paper is to derive an optimal feedback rule based on the model 
proposed by Ball (1998) and to estimate a short run reaction function for interest rates for 
Brazil, for an open economy. The main assumption is that interest rates are the central 
bank's main instrument to reduce inflation and the level of activity.  
 
Normally, models estimating IS-AS-type models use OLS regressions. In this paper we 
derive an optimal feedback rule and use the estimated coefficients from IS-AS equations to 
find an empirical relation between central bank's instrument and macroeconomic variables 
such as inflation, output gap and exchange rates. We suggest the use of two stage least 
squares using adequate instrumental variables to estimate these equations to overcome 
problems inherent to the nature of Brazilian macroeconomic variables
2. We also compare 
our results with those found in the literature.  
 
The plan of the paper is as follows. In the first section we derive a Taylor rule for the 
Brazilian economy. Section two presents empirical results. In the last section we conclude 
and give directions for further research. 
 
 
2.    The model  
 
In this section an optimal monetary rule is derived for the Brazilian economy. We use the 
following IS equation: 
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where  t y  stands for the output gap,  t i is the real interest rate,  t e  is the real exchange rate, 
                                                                 
1 For an interesting analysis of inflation targeting see Walsh (2001). 
2   Using instrumental variables for the terms containing lagged inflation is crucial 
because these terms are correlated with the residuals.  5 
and  t u  is a demand shock, assumed to be normally distributed. 
 
The supply curve is represented by the traditional Phillips curve: 
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where  t p  is the inflation rate,  t e D  is the depreciation rate in the nominal exchange rate 
and  1 + t h  is the supply shock not correlated with  1 + t u . 
 
The policy maker chooses in instant t the interest rate  t i , and the state variable in instant t 
is: 
 
( ) 1 ttttt zy gpmee - =++-             (2.3) 
 
The optimal feedback rule will be given by: 
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Equations (1) and (2) can be rewritten as: 
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The objective of the policy maker is to minimize this loss function subject to: 
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Solving problem (2.11) with respect to  t q  gives the first order condition: 
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Applying the envelope theorem with respect to  t z  obtains: 
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Multiplying (2.13) by g , substituting in (2.12), taking this expression one-step forward and 
the expectations 
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Replacing (2.14) in (2.12): 
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q          (2.15) 
 
When the policy is established in instant t,  t z  is the state variable and thus the optimal 
policy rule has a quadratic form  t t Xz = q . Therefore  
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replacing this expression in (2.15) obtains the following quadratic form: 
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Stability requires  1 ) 1 ( 2 1 < + + X a g . Hence, the solution for (2.17) is given by: 
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The root of interest is the one that satisfies the stability condition, that is the negative root 
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3.   Empirical Results 
 
For the econometric analysis we have used quarterly data and our sample begins in the first 
quarter of 1994 and ends in the last quarter of 2001. All variables are in natural logs. As a 
proxy for the output gap we have estimated a Hodrick-Prescott filter and used the 
difference between observed GDP and the filtered series. The inflation rate is given by 
IPCA. The interest rate is given by SELIC which is the instrument that the central bank 
uses to achieve it's price stability goals.  
 
According to the results found in table 1 both the lag of the output gap and lagged interest 
rate are significant in explaining current output gap, and the sign of the coefficients are in 
line with the expected sign. We used as instruments a dummy for the Russian crisis, three 
lags for the interest rate and four lags for the government spending.  
 
 
Table 1. IS equation - Closed Economy 
Variables  Coefficients  p-value 
1 - t y   0.34** 
(0.1697) 
0.04 




2 = 77%     
Standard errors are given in parenthesis 
* Rejection of the null with 99% confidence 
** Rejection of the null with 95% confidence 
 
 
Table 2 presents empirical results for the Phillips equation. Both lagged output gap and 
inflation are significant in explaining current inflation. We have used as instruments a 






Table 2. Phillips equation - Closed Economy 
Variables  Coefficients  p-value 
1 - t y   0.34** 
(0.014) 
0.029 




2 = 90%     
Standard errors are given in parenthesis 
* Rejection of the null with 99% confidence 
** Rejection of the null with 95% confidence 
 
 
Applying Augmented Dickey and Fuller tests the null of a unit root for the output gap, 
interest rates and inflation is rejected. Results for these unit roots are available upon 
request from the authors. 
 
In order to derive the optimal policy rule for the Brazilian economy we assumed  b =0.7 
and l =1, which are the intertemporal discount factor and the relative weight of output gap 
in the loss function. After replacing this parameters and coefficients in table 1 and 2 one 
obtains 
 
                 5,54,2 ttt iyp =+                                        (3.1) 
 
Our results are quite different from those found in Taylor (1993) and Ball (1998) and are 
more in line with those found in Walsh (1997).  
 
 
Table 3. Comparison of optimal rules - Closed Economy 
Coefficients 
t y   t p   1 t y -  
Taylor (1993)  0.50  1.50  - 
Walsh (1997)  4.37  1.26  1.59 
Authors   5.5  4.2  - 
Ball (1998)  0.80  1.46  - 
 
 
The coefficient on the output gap is similar to that found in Ball (1998), while the 
coefficient on inflation is much higher than that of the rest, which suggests that the central 
bank of Brazil has to increase it's interest rates much more than developed countries in 
order to counterbalance an increase in inflation. 
 










Table 4. IS equation - Open Economy 
Variables  Coefficients  p-value 
1 - t y   0.36** 
(0.168) 
0.04 
2 - t e   -0.04** 
(0.018) 
0.05 




2 = 75%     
Standard errors are given in parenthesis 
* Rejection of the null with 99% confidence 
** Rejection of the null with 95% confidence 
 
 
Table 5. Phillips equation - Open Economy 
Variables  Coefficients  p-value 
1 - t y   0.08** 
(0.05) 
0.02 
t e D   0.07** 
(0.01) 
0.03 




2 = 64%     
Standard errors are given in parenthesis 
* Rejection of the null with 99% confidence 
** Rejection of the null with 95% confidence 
 
 
Replacing the results one obtains the optimal rule: 
t t t t t e y i D + + + = - 2 . 0 6 . 0 3 . 0 2 . 5 1 e p          (3.2) 
 
To the best of our knowledge, most research on developed countries has estimated 
different optimal feedback rules, making comparisons more difficult. As we can see, the 
coefficient on inflation has decreased to 0.3. Thus, the nominal interest rate is increased 
more than five-to-one with increases in output gap. The cost to reduce inflation seems to be 
lower in an open economy, which is an argument in favor of commercial liberalization.  
 
 
4.   Conclusions 
 
In this paper we have presented an optimal policy rule for the central bank to achieve it's 
monetary policy goals, derived using a dynamic programming approach and a dynamic 
loss function. We estimated IS-AS equations using two stage least squares and fitted an 
optimal feedback rule for short run interest rates for both a closed and open economy.  
We have found that the feedback rule behaves differently from similar rules estimated for 
developed countries. For the open economy evidence suggests that interest rates needs to 
raise less than a one-to-one with inflation (while the contrary happens within a closed 
economy). Thus, it is found that within an open economy the central banks have much 
more power to reduce inflation than within a closed economy. This issue will be left for 
further research.  10 
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